From 'Red carpet' to 'Iron curtain': a case study of UK mass media mapping of the European secuirty architecture in the 1990s
Paper presented at the Budapest Mass Media Map Workshop, Eötvös Loránd University, 16-19 January 1999.
Peter Vujakovic
Principal Lecturer, Department of Geography and Tourism,
Faculty of Social and Information Sciences,
Canterbury Christ Church University College (UK)
Email: [email protected]
Abstract
It is becoming clear increasingly clear that mass public opinion in democratic states is an important force in international politics. Politicians are no longer able to field troops, even for peace keeping activities, without the support of their electorate. The mass news media provide the conduits through which most people obtain their information regarding international issues. Most of these issues are inherently geographical and include maps as key element in any news report. This paper explores the specific issue of UK news media coverage of European security issues in the1990s. It indicates th importance of maps as an element in the continual evolution of the public image of the European geopolitical landscape.
The 1990s witnessed the publication of a plethora of cartographic representations in the British news media on the subject of the 'new Europe'. These representations are part of a broad debate concerning the emerging post-Cold War European political landscape. This study reveals a subtle change from essentially triumphalist representations of the European politicallandscape during the early 1990s to a re-trenchment into 'realist' images, more redolent of the Cold-War period, in recent years.
[For copyright reasons it is presently not possible to display the news media maps discussed in this paper. However, maps from the 'Electronic Telegraph' (the web version of The Daily Telegraph) which are discussed in the text can be accessed using the arcive facility at http://www.telegraph.co.uk]
Introduction: Maps in the news media
The old Europe has gone. The map is being rolled up and a new map is unrolling before us. We shall have to do a great deal of fundamental thinking and scrapping of old points of view before we find our way through the new continent which now opens before us."
General Smuts, Empire Parliamentary Association, November 25, 1943 (Fitz-Gerald, 1946).
Whether real or metaphorical, maps have played an important historically role in the making of competing ideological constructions of the European political space. From the early 1990s maps have formed an important element of the debates surrounding the emergence of new European identities and a new geopolitical landscape. During this period of rapid change cartography has been mobilised to explore a range of issues; for example, the geographical limits of the new Europe, the European credentials of new nation states, and the impact of (re)emergent geopolitical 'fracture zones' (specifically those in eastern Europe and the Balkans) on the evolving European security architecture and political landscape. This study focuses on the ideological role of maps within the news media, the conduit through which the vast majority of the population in the UK obtain information about the political world in which they live.
The news media's 'speculative mapping' of Europe during the early 1990s provides a clear indication of the anxieties circulating within western elitŽs during this period of political flux, and of the ideological stances underlying their prescriptions for dealing with the potential 'security' issues involved. These anxieties are exposed, for instance, in references to 'fortress Europe', or the decent into 'barbarism' on Europe's southern 'frontiers'. Underlying these geographic images, however, can be discerned a fundamental belief in the inherent superiority of Western European values, institutions and approaches, and the need to extend these into the regions formely dominated by the Soviet Union..
The mid to late 1990s witnessed a subtle change in the nature of news media mapping of the new Europe. The periphery is still portrayed as a region of potential chaos, however, the assumed superiority of the western model, and assumption that European security can be guaranteed by the continuous eastward extension of its institutions, is gradually being called into question. This change, and its cartographic expression, can only be understood if viewed within the wider ideological debates within the fields of international relations and geopolitics concerning 'regional security'.
The ideological nature of 'news' is widely accepted within the social sciences (Fowler, 1991; Eldridge, 1993). It is even argued that the news media's function is essentially one of social reproduction, in the service not of society as a whole, but of its elitŽs. The media are regarded, like other institutions within a class-based society, as producers of ideology, representing the interests of a dominant minority to the subordinate majority (McNair, 1994). This paper aims to extent this critical analysis to understanding the role of mass media maps.
Maps as sites of popular ideological discourse
The ideological approach to understanding map representation adopted in this paper emerges from a growing dialogue between cartographic researchers and workers in other disciplines concernedwith visual and verbal representation (MacEachren, 1995). The study of mass media cartography is beginning to benefit from developments in communication and media studies, and in cultural and political geography (specifically the emerging sub-field of'critical geopolitics' (Vujakovic, 1997)).
Several approaches to the study of the ideological content in cartography have emerged during the last decade. These aim to explore beneath the surface of the map, to undertand is relationship to other layers withinthe cultural constructs in which it is embedded. The work of the late Brian Harley has been seminal in stimulating critical evaluation of the role of cartographic representation within a wider political and cultural context. Harley (1990) stressed that as'....a discourse created and received by human agents, maps represent the world through a veil of ideology, are fraught with internal tensions, provide classic examples of power-knowledge, and are always caught up in wider political concerns'. Harley's advocacy of a 'deconstructionist' approach has played an important part in encouraging a shift in thinking in the study of cartography (Harley, 1988a, 1989, 1992). He argued that 'rhetoric is part of the way all texts work and that all maps are rhetorical texts...All state an argument about the world and...are propositional in nature.' (Harley, 1989). In this context, the term 'text' relates to any artefact which communicates meaning about individuals, their social setting, or the world around them (Barnes & Duncan, 1992). The task of those concerned with the study of maps, according to this view, is to unearth the socio-political practices that they both reflect and employ. The process of deconstruction involves 'reading between the lines' of the text to reveal the contradictions, tensions and silences that challenge its apparent honesty (Harley, 1992).
Harley's most important contributions to the study of mass media cartography are his concerns with knowledge as power, and the issue of 'intertextuality'. Notwithstanding Belyea's (1992) criticism of Harley's understanding and adaptation of Foucault's ideas concerning 'power/knowledge', Harley's discussion of the 'hidden power' of maps is extremely useful. Harley refers to two forms of power in cartography. First, the 'external power' exerted on and through cartography according to the agenda of the map maker or a patron (monarch, state institution, news editor). And secondly, the 'internal power' of the map to convey an image of 'order' through selection, abstraction and generalisation, and thereby 'naturalise' the 'world-view ' of the authoring agency. Linked to this concern with the play of power in and through the map as 'text' is a recognition that "the objects of enquiry, whether they be landscapes, maps or government documents, must be approached intertextually; texts from other conceptual realms cross-cut, transform and, in turn, are transformed by the texts in question" (Barnes & Duncan, 1992; p.13). As Harley (1989b) noted, "A textual approach alerts us to the shadows of other texts in the one we are reading." (p.85). Clearly, an intertextual approach is fundamental to understanding how maps operate as part of the knowledge created and circulated by the news media.
Rundstrom (1991), while agreeing with much of Harley's analyses, is critical of the tendency of so-called 'postmodernist' approaches to place too much emphasis on the discussion of maps as 'texts', while tending to ignoring the wider technical and social processes within which they are embedded. Rundstrom does not, however, seek to reject nor replace Harley's agenda, but add a new dimension to the conceptual approaches available to those studying the social and political dimensions of cartography. He argues for a 'process cartography', consisting of two concentric ideas. The first situates the 'map artefact' within the realm of technical production, while the second"...places the entire map-making process within the context of intracultural and intercultural dialogues over a much longer span of time" (p.6). Process cartography is posited on "the idea that maps-as-artefacts are inseparable from mapping-as-process, and that the mapping process in turn, is made necessary and meaningful only by the broader context of the cultural processes within which it is located" (Rundstrom, 1993; p.21). This approach provides a useful framework for the study of contemporary maps and mapping, because of its emphasis on the importance of acknowledging the technical, organisational and design issues involved in map production. This is especially relevant to the study of the news media because of the huge constraints on producing maps for print or television (e.g. short deadlines, print quality, opportunity costs of 'image space' versus 'word space' (see Monmonier, 1989; Perkins and Parry, 1996)). Any study must acknowledge these operational and technical constraints, and their impact on the final product - the map on the page or screen. There is, for example, the danger that time constraints may result in a simplifiedmap, in which certain features are neglected. This might be interpreted as a 'political silence', the deliberate supression of information counter to the ideological position of the authoring agency (O'Keefe, 1982; Harley, 1988a; Burgess, 1990) rather than a genuine error of ommission.
Within the wider research literature on geographic representation, the field of 'critical geopolitics', with its insistence on the need to 'deconstruct' the representational practices of elites (Dalby & O'Tuathail, 1994; O'Tuathail & Dalby, 1996), provides a useful epistemological nexus with the approach to cartographic research outlined above. Critical geopolitics seeks to challenge the 'naturalised' images of the political world created by traditional'realist' geopolitics -"which holds that the world is self evident or that the facts simply 'speak for themselves'" (Dodds & Sidaway, 1994; p.518). In this respect it is closely allied to Harley's and Rundstrom's agendas. Critical geopolitics attempts to 'deconstruct' the representational practices through which policy elites shape the'world-view' of individuals and groups. The importance of sites of popular geopolitical discourse (e.g. news media, schools, cinema), as well as official policy documents, is recognised and research has expanded into this area, although little work has yet been undertaken on maps in the news media (see Vujakovic, 1997).
A major problem remains the development of a suitable approach to analysing (carto)graphic images. Burgess (1990) is critical of the trend within cultural geography which extends 'literary theory' to visual forms of representation (landscape paintings, photographs, maps). She argues that attempts to treat visual forms as 'texts' is a useful reminder of their symbolic function, but can be transformed into the erroneous belief that they can be analysed using linguistic rules alone. Some researchers within the field of cartography have been careful to use the term in Burgess' restricted, metaphorical sense (e.g. Pickles, 1992; Vujakovic, 1995) thereby avoiding the pit-falls inherent in an exclusively linguistic approach.. As MacEachren (1995) has argued, however, a broadly 'lexical' approach has provided useful insights into the layers of meaning in maps. He cites in particular Denis Wood's (1992) book The Power of Map and the corpus of work by Brian Harley (although Harley has also used an explicitly 'iconographic' approach (e.g. Blakemore and Harley (1980)). A way forward may emerge from a synthesis of the 'textual/lexical' approach to cartography, with analytical approaches to media images adapted from the field of graphic design (e.g. Wildbur, 1989; Houkes, 1995; Kress and van Leeuwen, 1996). Kress and van Leeuwen, for example, have made some very useful observations concerning the use of visual perspective to create politico-cultural 'positionality' in terms of the map/graphic viewer and the viewed event/situation (e.g. the use by the Western news media of oblique maps to position the viewer with the 'allies' during the Gulf Conflict).
Another problem, and one which has major significance for the study of Europe's changing political landscape, is linked to both the issue of the technologies of production (Rundstrom's first circuit), and analysis of graphic images as if they were linguistic 'texts'. The problem relates to the difficulties of representing, through maps, the complexities of international relations and geopolitics. Jeremy Black (1997) makes the point in his recent book 'Maps and Politics':
It is far from clear how to map a maelstrom of overlapping and potentially conflicting divisions, but they are of the essence of the complex nature of modern society and politics. The obvious strategy is to focus on what seems most meaningful and mappable, and to recognise the resulting bias. The complexity of the relationship between space and society is such that the limits of what maps can convey as analytical texts are reached quite quickly.(p.73).
Care has to be taken to not read too much, or too little, into cartographic images.Any apparent contradictions between a map and the discourse in which it is embedded may reflect the limitations of cartography as a representational medium (especially given the constraints inherent in producing graphics for the news media, rather than a hidden agenda or internal tensions within the discourse itself. We may, however, be equally tempted to treat the medium as too limited (especially if restricting analysis to linguistic approaches) and ignore the (visual) subtleties of the form.
The most obvious problem facing cartographers when portraying the new Europe is that it is much easier to map the boundaries of states (the traditional landscape of 'realist' international relations and of power-politics) than many of the other 'political landscapes' of contemporary importance, for example the topographies of ethnic tension, or of migrant flows. Cartography is an excellent medium through which to represent spatially distinct areas (legally defined territories), and lines (national borders), but lessgood when it comes to 'fuzzy' boundaries (culture regions), or intersecting and overlapping 'classes' of information (dialect groups, religious affiliations, etc.).
The changing European security agenda
In order to understand the role of cartography in news media representations of the new Europe, it is necessary to provide an outline of the European 'security' debate. The debate provides the politoco-cultural context in which the news media maps are embedded and to some extent create.
The construction of a national or supra-national security agenda involves both the identification of the threats involved (their source, form and object) and the appropriate response. The mass media in turn provide important conduits for dissemination of security agendasto a wider public. This is particularly important in 'democratic' societies, where the government must carry public opinion, especially if their policies are likely to inflict severe economic costs or loss of life. The United States' debacle in the Vietnam War provides a classic example of the failure to fully secure public support in a matter of security policy. Many commentators have suggested that televising the war played a key role in the loss of public support (the so-called 'Vietnam Syndrome'). Whether this was justified or not Taylor (1992) makes the critical point that it was certainly perceived by policy-makers as accounting for swings in public mood, hence their need to ensure a sympathetic media representation in the future.
An understanding of perceived threats to western Europe and to the evolving European security agenda is fundamental to a comprehension of the UK news media's reporting, mapping and analysis of the new European geopolitical landscape. The nature of threat has altered markedly with the demise of the Soviet Union. The focus for security, at least in military terms, has shifted from a clear concern with the geopolitical and military aims of the Soviet Union, to much more diffuse anxieties linked to ethnic nationalism, and the instability of Europe's eastern and southern periphery.
The Cold War era
The immediate post-WWII security agenda of the West was dominated by the perceived threat from the the Soviet Union and its allies in the Warsaw Pact. The associated security discourses fluctuated between periods of aggressive'Cold War' rhetoric and dŽtente. During this period the news media and accompaying maps played an important mediating role in terms of public understanding of government policies and actions, and in the formulation of'world views' and geopolitical codes (the operating code of a state's foriegn policy, for example the 'containment' policies developed by the US to deal with the percieved threat from the Soviet Uion (Taylor, P.J., 1993)).
Several authors have explored the role of cartography during this period. Burnett's (1985) study of 'propaganda cartography' focuses on this period, and on the issue of nuclear threat in particular. He provides a comprehensive overview of the use of cartography for ideological ends in terms of both 'official' and 'popular' sites of geopolitical discourse (e.g. material published by defence ministries on both sides of the 'Iron Curtain', news papers and journals, and by protest organisations (e.g the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND)). Henriksen, in a series of seminal papers (Henriksen, 1974, 1975, 1980) even goes so far as to argue that American Cold-War conceptualisations of threat were inherently linked to the role of cartography in the dictating a fundamentally new world outlook, that of 'Air-age globalism'. Other authors provide more anecdotal evidence of the importance of maps as part of popular geopolitical discourse during this era (Ager, 1977; Murray, 1987; Monmonier and Schell, 1988; Vujakovic, 1990, 1992; Pickles, 1992).
The competing security discourses of the period revolved around the specific nature of the source of the threat:
For some it lay in the alleged expansionist ambitions of the Soviet government. For others it was caused by the incompatibility of thecapitalist and communist systems. For still others it was caused by the massive losses of the Soviet Union during the Second World War, which caused the communists to arm themselves against any possibility of future invasion from the West. (Budge and Newton, 1997; p.391)
The contested nature of the Soviet threat helps to explain the competing ideological approaches during this period. Western institutional responses varied between those who espoused 'containment' and the use of nuclear deterrence, to those proposing a more consilliatory approach and negotiations on nuclear arms reduction. These ideological positions can be broadly characterised as 'realist' and 'liberal-idealist' . Realists have traditionally conceptualised international relations in terms of power and interest, with security defined in terms of a state's ability to promote its own interests within a largely anarchical international system. Idealists, on the other hand, place emphasis on notions of international co-operation and collective security. For the latter, power struggles are understood in terms of fear of attack rather than attempts to gain dominance (Dalby, 1990).
Despite the incompatible ideological positions of the two superpowers, Waever (1995) describes their security programmes (with respect to their own spheres of influence within Europe), as largely 'idealistic'/'integrationist'. For example, Western European integration was strongly supported by successive American governments. Particular emphasis was placed on the reconciliation of France and Germany as the precondition for a peaceful, economically secure Europe. In the east, the Soviet Union propounded a similar internationalist message. These approaches were both proffered as alternatives to the failed 'realist' power politics of the European powers prior to WWII. However, as critics of US foreign policy have noted, the 'idealist' theme can be interpreted as cover for a 'realist' approach to control of its strategic 'Grand Area' (Chomsky, 1982). Nevertheless, Dalby (1990) stresses that while "idealism and realism are usually blurred in the practice of international politics ... the focus of idealism on peace and realism on power remain as useful distinguishing factors" (p.89) in the analysis of security discourse.
The overt competition between these two apparently 'universalist' models eventually provided the basis for interpreting the collapse of the Soviet Union, and of its economic and political agenda in eastern Europe, as a demonstrable victory for the 'superior' Western capitalist model - the model that comes to dominate both verbal and cartographic representations during the present post Cold-War period.
The new Europe
Following the relatively peaceful revolutions in eastern Europe the perceived threats to the security of western Europe altered fundamentally. As Russell (1995) notes:
The continuity and the predictability of the bipolar division of Europe ... has given way to an unsettled security environment. Post-Cold War security arrangements in Europe are only haltingly taking shape due to the absence of clearly recognisable threats. The uncertainty over the likelihood or types of threat to emerge in Post-Cold War Europe hampers the rapid formulation and implementation of new security frameworks". (p.241)
The evolution of a new western security agenda has been a relatively cautious process, although clearly posited on a broadly liberal programme of integrationism. This caution mixed with optmism in Western values is clearly manifest in the media maps of the period. Despite early uncertainties about the security situation within the new Europe, a general consensus began to emerge regarding the key issues. These include anxieties about:
i) the nature and speed of economic and political reform;
ii) the [re]emergence of xenophobic nationalism and the potential for inter-ethnic conflicts and other 'minorities' issues;
ii) and, the possible resurgence of Russian 'imperialism'.
All of these issues emerge within the media debate concerning Europe and form importantelements within many cartographic depictions. It is important to recognise these elements in the maps, and fully understand their significance in European security discourse.
Doubts have certainly arisen in both government and media circles concerning the degree to which political and economic change has become deeply rooted in the countries of the former Soviet Bloc (Budge and Newton, 1997). The extent to which some candidatestates for EU membership fulfil the Copenhagen principles regarding democratic institutions, human rights, and the existence of a functioning market economy, has also been called into question (Burghardt and Cameron,1997). Economic problems are seen as a threat to confidence in the 'free market' and associated 'western' style financial and political institutions (the very crux of the idealist programme for Europe).
Another important perceived threat lies in the explosive mixture of ethnic groups within east and central Europe. Phases of nation building since 1918, including the present, have created problems for marginalised minorities (Kolossov and Treivish, 1998). New states, both past and present, have been largely concerned with serving the interests of their dominant ethnic group(s), which has usually meant overriding the rights of others (Shaw, 1998). The tensions that this engenders, in terms of wider European security, are evident in crises such as the present conflict between ethnic Albanians and Serbs in the Yugoslav province of Kosovo.
Finally, there is a perception that Russia might attempt to regain its sphere of influence in eastern Europe. While this seems unlikely, given current economic and political trends, the Russian dominated Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), could provide the basis for a competing strategic alliance in the future (Sergovnin, 1997). The integration of Russia within a wider 'European home' is by no means assured. While Russia appears to be in no state to act as a global hegemonic challenger (Agnew and Corbridge, 1995), it could create a significant danger if it resumed a 'garrison-state' approach to its relations with the rest of the world (Yanov, 1987; see speech by Andrei Kozyrev (1998) for contrary viewpoint).
The 'liberal-idealist' response to these threats is to integrate the new nation states within western economic and political structures, particularly through membership of international and supra-national institutions. Such measures are espoused as an escape from the uncertainties and the perceived failures of both traditional 'balance of power' politics and unwieldy 'universal' collectives (e.g. League of Nations, United Nations) (Russell, 1995). Politicians and policy makers rely on the 'press' and other channels of popular geopolitical discourse to 'sell' this (potentially costly) approach to the public. Most debate has focused on the EU. Burghardt and Cameron (1997) suggest, for example, that the benefits of enlargement could be considerable. As well as creating conditions for economic security in the east, the enlarged market should stimulate economic growth throughout the Union, bind the new states into political structures which enhance general stability, and increase co-operation in the fields of justice, law enforcement and environmental standards.
Integrationist strategies also involve the extension of formal defence and security arrangements to include eastern Europe. The long term aim is to create a comprehensive European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI). This has not yet emerged outside of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation). NATO remains the cornerstone of European security arrangements, despite attempts to strengthen the role of the Western European Union (WEU) and the Organisation on Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). NATO, a product of the Cold War, has adapted to the challenges of the new era by broadening its definition of 'security' to include the promotion of stability and peaceful post-communist transition in central and eastern Europe. It has actively promoted a pan-European security relationshipthrough such initiatives as the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC), and the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, which have provided fora for consultation between NATO and the new democracies (Kay, 1997; Williams and Ruhle, 1997).
Liberal institutionalists believe that a collective security structure can be created through NATO enlargement and increasing transparency in defence planning. Realists are split between those that see NATO's role as in decline (since the removal of the common threat posed by the Soviet Union), while others believe it still has a 'neo-containment' role (with regard to the threat from a resurgent Russia, and the need for internal containment of Germany) (Kay, 1997).
While many European governments clearly regard NATO widening in a positive light, concerns have been voiced over the possible 'dilution' effects of enlargement. Sherr (1995) notes the uneasiness with which the Visigrad states greeted the 'Partnership for Peace' (PfP) programme, which appeared to place states like Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan on an equal footing to themselves within the evolving security architecture. Russia's potentially negative response also remains of concern (Perlmutter and Carpenter, 1998). Sergounin (1997) provides an excellent review of Russian arguments against enlargement; foremost of which is that Polish, Czech and Hungarian membership will destroy the existing 'security buffer' between NATO and Russia, and this will create a shift in the strategic balance in favour of the West.
Realists question many of the assumptions underlying these integrationist programmes. Russell (1995), for example, raises several issues of concern. First, a pan-European security organisation must inevitably commit itself to maintaining the status quo in terms of the present territorial configuration of territorial states. He suggests that ethnic nationalism will almost inevitably create future territorial disputes which will "...not lend [themselves] to the rules governing a collective security organisation... [because the] theory assumes that a state or states responsible for disrupting the status quo would be readily identifiable and subject to punitive measures." (p.246). Secondly, that divergent national interests will undermine collective action. He points to the differing French, German and British reactions to the civil war in Bosnia. Thirdly, he questions the extent to which the public would be prepared to back their government if no obvious national interest were involved. He summaries the realist position:
Collective security enforcement would only be possible under circumstances in which the national interests of member states converge with an interest in the preservation of the status quo. In practice, this confluence of factors would not occur with everythreat to the status quo due to the political and geographical diversity of the European states. Each challenge to the status quo that escaped collective enforcement would erode the system's deterrent based on the credible threat to marshal preponderant strength against all threats. (pp. 248-9)
He argues that 'collective security' could ultimatelyexpand rather than limit conflict in Europe.
Miall (1993) warns of similar problems inherent in an integrated security system. His analysis relates to wider economic as well as military structures which are needed to ensure security in Europe. He notes that for an 'amalgamated security community' to function effectively requires a number of key features to be in place. These include: compatible values and expectations; anticipation of economic gains within a stable political system; ordered communication between national political elites (and between these elites and society in general); effective mobility of populations within the territory of the'security community'; multiple transactions; and mutually predictable behaviours. He believes that a reasonable degree of conformity does exist within elite groups as to the core values of multi-party democracy and free markets, but that differences in wider political culture and public attitudes across Europe are likely to undermine the integrationists' programme. Like Russell, Miall also believes that integration could create conditions for conflict rather than stability. He emphasises the problem of 'internalising' problems, which can later lead to fragmentation of an amalgamated security community.
Cartography and the 'making of Europe' - a prelude to mass media mappings
The media's mapping of the new European security architecture can be interpreted within the context of wider cartographic 'myths', which have been perpetuated over many centuries and are now being woven into contemporary political discourse. The term myth, in this context, represents "an intellectual construction which embodies beliefs, values and information, and which can influence events, behaviour and perception."(Short, 1991). The approach used in this and previous work (Vujakovic, 1993) draws upon the concept of myth as an anxiety reducing mechanism as a means of understanding the news media representations of Europe. Myths help society to understand how to live with or deal with the problems that they face.
Representations of Europe, both as a geographic, and more particularly as a cultural-political entity, have traditionally involved the use of cartography (see Vujakovic, 1992; den Boer, 1995; Wintle, 1996). Maps provide concrete visualisations of the meanings involved in particular interpretations of 'Europe'. And because of the general acceptance of the mimetic nature of maps, they help to 'naturalise' particular ideological positions.
Maps have been an essential support to the notion of Europe as a distinct and separate continent, despite the fact that Europe is simply one rather small appendage of the continent Eurasia (Jordan, 1973). While in purely topographical terms the 'continental' idea is not sustainable, the myth of 'separateness' has been perpetuated for reasons associated with maintaining the politico-cultural integrity of the region. During the last few hundered years itbecame generally accepted that the Caucasus and Ural mountains, together with the Black Sea form this divide. This arbitrary division has continued to have implications for politico-cultural concepts of Europe, specifically the role of Russia as a 'Eurasian' power.
The idea of Europe as a cultural entity, and the possibility of some form of European unity and citizenship, have relatively recent origins (see Wilson & van der Dussen, 1995; Graham, 1998; and Unwin, 1998). Antecedents may, however, be traced to the dichotomy between 'civilisation' and 'barbarism' in classical Greek thought, culminating in the religious division between Christianity and Islam ('Christendom' of the early medieval period was roughly coextensive with generally accepted definitions a 'geographical' Europe). Tartar and Ottoman invasions of the eastern Orthodox lands during the thirteenth century saw the contraction of Christian dominance to the Catholic lands in the west and Christendom became associated with north-west Europe as a stronghold against Islam (Seton-Watson, 1989; Wallace, 1990). The vulnerability of eastern Europe to Asiatic influence has long prejudiced western perceptions of the limits of Europe. It was not, however, until the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that ideas concerning 'Europe' as a cultural-political entity began to take shape. This coincided with the rise of secular states and the failure of religion as a unifying force during the wars of the reformation (Seton-Watson, 1989). During the following centuries the European idea underwent a variety of transformations. Bugge (1995) provides a useful critical commentary on the development of these ideas up to the early part of the twentieth century. A number of key concepts (e.g. Masaryk's 'new Europe', and Coudenhove-Kalergi's 'Paneuropa') were built on ideas of a democratic, co-operative, and even federalist Europe, which rehearse post-Cold War conceptualisations of European integration.
In the late twentieth century the fall of east-central Europe to Soviet dominion reinforced earlier myths of a western European core; a 'stronghold' against authoritarian, collectivist and monolithic influences issuing from Asia. For much of the Cold War period 'Europe' came to mean western Europe, while to 'become part of Europe' meant membership of the European Community (EC) (Wallace, 1990; Morley & Robins, 1995). Only in the late 1980s, following Gorbachev's renunciation of the 'Brezhnev doctrine' and his growing accommodation with the US, were the countries of east-central Europe able to be re-incorporated into new, vaguely defined ideas of a European whole (Schopflin & Wood, 1989).
The historic events of 1989 threw residual Cold-War myths into disarray. Questions concerning the nature of Europe and Europeaness began to be debated vigourously. The simple division into East and West (temporarily) disappeared and a range of new metaphors, cartographic as well as verbal, began to be employed by politicians, academics, and especially the media, to describe a variety of 'new Europes'. Many of these ideas made direct reference to older myths, particularly those related to ideas of a western European core or 'stronghold', threatened by chaos and disruption on its southern and eastern borders.
Mapping the new Europe(s): The early 1990s
The driving force behind much of the news media's 'mapping' of the new Europe in the 1990s was the issue of security and the related dilemma of what constitutes a 'European' identity. In the early years of the decade this was dominated by inchoate anxieties (fuelled by the bloody conflicts in the former Yugoslavia), of a descent into xenophobic nationalism, barbarism, and economic chaos in the 'borderlands' of Europe, and the possibility that these issues would spill over into the European core. The response of the West has been to encourage the new nation-states to adopt western economic and political values. This was seen by many politicians and commentators as involving the enlargement of key institutions (e.g. EU, NATO) as part of an evolving'continent-wide' security agenda. Media representations of the new Europe tended to echo and support these 'liberal-integrationist' ideas.
The examples discussed below are drawn from the UK's 'quality' print news media, or their 'electronic' counterparts (e.g. The Electronic Telegraph). The importance of televised maps should not, however, be ignored. Television reaches a wide and diverse audience, and is likely to have a strong influence on an individual's 'cognitive map' of geopolitical issues. Nevertheless, televised maps are generally displayed for a very short duration, are generally very simplified, and are effectively ephemeral (Scharfe, 1997). Another argument for focusing on the 'quality broadsheets', is that these are the newspapers which inform and influence individuals concerend with international affairs. It has been shown that these 'elite' newspapers use a significant number of maps to locate or explain international social, political and military issues (Perkins and Parry, 1996).
One of the majorproblems facing any attempt to study the ideological content of media maps has been the lack of an adequate analytical framework. Much of the research into so-called 'persuasive-cartography' (which includes 'journalistic maps'), has simply focused on technical aspects of cartographic design (use of symbols, colour, projection, etc.) to connote a particular viewpoint, and has failed to address the cultural mechanisms by which maps are able to reinforce, or otherwise influence beliefs. An earlier study of media maps of Europe (Vujakovic, 1993) attempted to resolve this by adopting a structuralist framework to analyse of 'myth'. Myths offer 'promises for problems' through themes (real or fictitious) that embody potent cultural meanings and give expression to profound, commonly held sentiments. A myth acts as an anxiety reducing mechanism "...by re-stating, on the deep level, the basic dilemmas of the human condition; and ... offering a solution to them. It re-iterates the essential problems of life - good and evil, life and death, happiness and misery etc., and simultaneously solves them." (Chapman & Egger, 1983).
The news media offers promises or solutions for contemporary political problems (Vujakovic, 1993). While they may occassional attempt to question or even subvert a specific policy, they retain broad support for the liberal Western political project. In the case of post Cold-War Europe, anxieties arose as a result of the break-up of the Soviet Empire, the crises in the Balkans, and problems of economictransition in eastern Europe. The news media not only reported these issues during the early 1990s, but actively promulgated myths which provided promises to these problems. Some of the problems were portrayed as having deep historical roots (for example, ethnic conflicts in the Balkans), hence older myths of Europe have been resurrected to deal with them. Other problems were regarded as new, and new mythshave been constructed. Maps played a major part in re-presenting and reinforcing these geographical myths.
Mapping the myth of 'stronghold Europe'
The most important 'meta-myth' promulgated through news media maps during the early 1990s was the historically recurrent theme of western Europe as 'stronghold'; as a bastion against alien influences from the east (barbarian hordes, Islam, or Soviet communism). The myth, in its contemporary manifestation, takes a number of forms, often involving the incorporation of subsidiary myths, and both visual and verbal metaphors (e.g. the recurrent image of a crisis zone in east-central Europe (Berend, 1986) and the resurrected concepts of Central Europe,'Mitteleuropa' (see Schopflin & Wood, 1989; Weaver, 1995) and Zwisheneuropa ('Europe-in-between') (van Ham, 1998)). The countries of east-central Europe are often presented as a geopolitical 'fault-zone', or as 'tidal lands' characterised by a turbulent history in the midst of the Great Powers (Gottmann, 1962)).
The seminal example of the cartographic representation of the 'stronghold' myth is The Sunday Times' 'Europe redrawn: the new continent' (27.10.91; p.30). This full colour map incorporated all of the key elements of the meta-myth. The map stressed the importance of a crisis zone in the European periphery; characterised by 'flashpoints', 'disputed borders', 'internecine feuds', 'tribal conflicts', and population movements. The problem zone was placed in contrast to the (relative) stability of the European Community (EC) and the European Free trade Area (EFTA). The latter were presented as offering a solution or promise - a 'Grand continental vision' - for the former Soviet bloc. Colours and symbols were used to reinforce the contrasts presented by the map. Fists and guns on red discs represented the disputed borders and flashpoints characteristic the 'tidal lands', while a rash of new national flags emphasised the rise in nationalist movements. The stability of western Europe was accentuated by the use of two shades of green, with connotations of calmness and productivity, in contrast to the arid, dun-brown used toportray eastern Europe. The liberal intergrationist promise is guaranteed by the continued existence of the mythical 'stronghold'. The 'stronghold' image is further reinforced by representing western Europe as under siege or threat of invasion. This is achieved (carto)graphically by utilising 'dynamic symbols' toindicate the flow of economic migrants from north Africa and eastern Europe into the EC. Bold red arrows are used to indicate immigrants 'flooding' toward the core from the chaotic periphery. The use of vivid 'complementary' colours (red and green), together with shadow effects enhanced the impression of peril. This device (recurrent in the media throughout the 1990s) makes use of principles originally developed for propaganda mapping purposes during the 1930s (Weigert, 1941; Quam, 1943).
Many maps of the period presented only one or other of the subsidiary myths or visual metaphors employed in The Sunday Times map. A vivid, full colour map entitled 'the new invasion', for example, had been published in Time magazine several months earlier (26.8.91; p.15 (UK edition)). This propagated a similar message regarding the danger to the core from the influx of economic migrants, and used the same basic cartographic techniques. The message was further reinforced by the manner in which the arrows are drawn; immigrants from Asia and Africa were represented by arrows sweeping around Europe and entering from the west, while those from southern and eastern Europe completed the total encirclement of the European core.
In apparent contrast to these images of threat, a double-page (broad-sheet) map of 'The New Europe' published by The Independent on Sunday (9.2.92;p.32-3) stressed the positive side of heterogeneity in a "...dazzling, diverse Europe..." Neal Ascherson (1992), in a commentary accompanying the map, used the metaphors of a 'patchwork quilt' and 'mosaic' to describe this new Europe. He compared the "austere solidity of our continent of nation-states" with the 'colourful mosaic' created by the rise of 'regionalism' in western Europe. His vision was reinforced by the multicoloured map showing the regional structures of a number of western European countries. The 'Europe des regions' envisaged by Ascherson would be composed of an increasingly loose structure of highly adaptable, economically and politically autonomous units. The success of the 'Four Motors' project, a co-operative venture in commerce and cultural exchange between Baden-Wurttemberg, Rhone-Alpes, Lombardy and Catalonia, is held up as a model of successful regionalist development. Ascherson commends this regionalist blue-print to the East; as a means to "...cope with their minority problems". The concurrent revival of nationalism, particularly in the eastern Europe, is recognised, but is seen as a temporary phase on route to "accepting essentially regional status within Europe". Contradictions are, however, evident in this vision. While the map appeared to celebrate regional diversity at one level, the nation state was still 'celebrated' through the display of national flags on the following page (these flags were an important part of the marginal information on a poster version of the map published by The Independent). Flags are highly potent symbols of nationhood, and their importance is demonstrated by the multitude of ways in which they have been revived and incorporated into the iconography of resurgent nationalism in east-central Europe. While the text and map acclaimed diversity in regionalism, the flags remain a poetent reminder that nationalism is likely to remain a very real force shaping the global political landscapein the 1990s (Taylor, P. J., 1992, 1993).
What, however, effectively unites these apparently disparate images of Europe, is their insistence that the new democratic states, having thrown off the shackles of communism, will find solutions (or promises) to their problems in Western models of development. Both the 'Grand vision' of a united Europe and Acherson's diversity of a 'Europe of the Regions', have their origin in a myth of 'Europe' characterised by a capitalist free-market system, democracy, and modernism (Seton-Watson, 1989; Schopflin & Wood, 1989; Schopflin, 1989), upheld and defended by the Western core or 'stronghold'. Such views can be criticised as the projection of a 'new capitalist frontier', which is at odds with the local realities of the east-central Europe. They can be regarded as an interpretation of history along the pre-existing 'battle-lines' of the Cold War - the ideologically motivated belief that Soviet power was defeated by the verifiably superior ideals of democracy and the free-market (Judt, 1991; Belloff, 1992).
This integrationist myth, based on the extension of Western values and institutions, was propagated through a large number of maps published during the period, all of which stressed a rolling programme of eastward, enlargement of the EU.
Who are the Europeans?
The fragmentation of the Soviet empire and the emergence of new nation states also resurrected questions of the geographical limits of Europe. This is obviously of importance to those states hoping to benefit from membership of the EU. Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome states that any European state may apply for membership (Wallace, 1990), but it does not define the limits. Under traditional cartographic definitions of Europe, the western Republics of the former Soviet Union (Belarus, Moldavia, the Ukraine), the Baltic states and the Russian Federation, could qualify. However, opinion remains divided over how truly 'European' they are in political-cultural terms (Schopflin, 1989). The status of the Trans-Caucasian republics of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan (all of which have indicated a desire to join the EU) is less clear still. Even though some of them have predominantly Christianpopulations they fall into a geopolitical grey-area which also contains Turkey and is dominated by Islam. Islam has traditionally been regarded as an extra-European influence, even though it has left a profound mark on many parts of the region and remainsan important factor in the culture and politics of a number of European states (e.g. Albania, former Yugoslav republics).
During the early 1990s, the news media provided a confusing variety of images of Europe beyond the core region. The position of the Trans-Caucasian republics illustrates this. The Daily Telegraph (23.12.91;p.28) in its maps of the 'new nations...', associates the Trans-Caucasian republics with those of Central Asia, rather than with 'the new nations of Europe', stating that they "have more in common with the Middle East than with Russia" (Philips, 1991). The Times (4.6.1992;p.13, and 26.6.1992;p13), in discussing the limits to Europe, and the question of EC membership, did not even include these republics in its maps. YetThe Observer (10.5.1992;p.16) included them when 'Mapping out a Europe of 42 countries', a month earlier. Both the Independent on Sunday (9.2.1992;pp.32-3) and The Financial Times (FT)(4.1.1993;pp.2-3) include the Trans-Caucasian republics in maps accompanying wider discussions of the meaning and future of 'Europe' (although the FT excluded the republics in a map of EC enlargement in 1992 (5.5.1992;p.2)).
Significantly, Turkey itself is included in almost all cartographic definitions of Europe published in the early 1990s. An exception is The Sunday Times (27.10.1991;p.30) 'Europe redrawn: the new continent', which pointedly excludes Turkey, despite its associate membership of the EC. Its reference to the idea of Europe as a 'continent' reflects a traditionalist view, with Europe as ending at the Bosphorus. However, a year later The Sunday Times (30.8.1992;p.12) includes Turkey, along with the Trans-Caucasian republics in a map of 'Europe's flashpoints', when inclusion lends credence to the discussion of chaos and conflict within Europe's periphery - again reinforcing images of the 'stronghold' under threat and the need to persue idealist integationist policies.The Economist (14.12.91;p.21) in contrast, makes positive use of cartography to argue for Turkey's "...claim to be considered as a candidate-member of the Europe of ideas, if not the Europe of formal geography." It locates Turkey (Anatolia) within the Roman and Byzantine Empires, showing that for about 1,600 years it partook in the marriage of Greek and Roman culture that gave rise to European civilisation and values.
Cartographic discourse on the limits to Europe is closely linked to subsidiary myths associated with the concept of a political fracture zone running through east and south-east Europe. These myths reflect and strengthen notions of a core and periphery; thereby reinforcing notions of the danger of non-European values and behaviours which periodically afflict the unstable 'tidal lands'.
The danger within?: 'Tribal wars' and associated myths
Media maps in the early 1990s also focused heavily on the internal pressures shaping the region. The concept of a 'shatterbelt' provided ample opportunity for the production of maps and associated graphics which used jigsaw and other motifs of fragmentation and potential decent into chaos. One of the most powerful elements within the larger security discourse on the future of Europe was the creation of a myth of 'tribalism' in the former Yugoslavia (Vujakovic, 1993). Terms such as 'tribe','tribal war' and 'ethnic' are used to imply more primitive, unsophisticated, and perhaps savage forms of organisation and identity than those associated with nationalism. This form of 'categorisation' is a recognised device in the ideological construction of meanings in news media (Jalbert, 1983). The recurrent use of such categories eventually leads to an affiliation between members of a group or region, for instance 'Serbs', and a particular attribute, for example 'savagery' or 'barbarism'. The language of tribalism and ethnicity is mobilised to 'other' the region - to 'map' it onto the chaotic periphery of Europe. Framing the Yugoslav conflicts as 'ethnic' or 'tribal' distances the issue from more positive uses of 'nationalist' vocabulary, for example those embedded within debates concerning 'deepening' of the EU and related issues of British 'national' culture, identity and sovereignty. Maps have been used extensively to illustrate issues in the Balkans and to explain and emphasise the complex ethnic mosaic underlying the Yugoslav conflict. The apparent lack of clear relationships between political (territorial) units and the (fragmented) distribution of peoples reinforced the images of disorder.
This, and other subsidiary myths propagated during the early 1990s acted as warnings of what might become of Europe if Western values and models of political and economic development were not extended eastward. By the mid to late 1990s, however, the 'idealist' vision of rolling out the red carpet of integration was being tempered by 'realist' concerns over the impacts of this process. These warnings appear to have been heeded and theUK news media became concerned with a wider European security discourse that accepted that the internal and external problems may force the brakes on expansion.
'Red carpet' or 'iron curtain'?: Maps and the metaphorical 'furnishing' of the European security architecture in the late 1990s
Despite some success, the late 1990s have been a period of relative disenchantment among both the public and EU governments with the integrationist programme. There has been a concomitant resurgence in realist critiques. This is reflected in the media's 'mapping' of Europe, with a more 'conservative' approach to the issue of enlargement of the EU and related issues. While the media's representation of the political landscape has retained elements of the idealist message, it is tinged with realist doubts in regard to the efficacy of 'widening' too precipitously.
Mapping the limits of enlargement
News media 'mappings' of the EU enlargement process in the late 1990s are increasingly pessimistic about the process. They still tend to take a broadly liberal and integrationist stance, but are also open to the use of realist rhetoric, and incorporate cartographic representations which reinforce this change. Rather than the image of a rolling programme of enlargement (which dominated most earlier maps), the idea of a new East-West geopolitical 'divide' is becoming established as a metaphors for the evolving security landscape. For example, the map accompanying Conradi and Scott's Sunday Times article, 'Farmers fear ruin from EU expansion' (15.3.98 p.24), is entitled 'Europe's economic iron curtain' (emphasis added). Whereas earlier examples tended to map out the contenders for EU membership, this map shows only the six front runners (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Hungary, Estonia and Cyprus). The tone of the article is essentially pessimistic. The authors uncover the realist assumptions, particularly those concerning the costs of enlargement, which potentially belie the continuing integrationist rhetoric of the EU:
The first and largely symbolic move towards enlargement came last Thursday [at] Lancaster House, in London. There, 11 aspiring members - from Estonia and Poland in the north to Bulgaria and Cyprus in the south - convened for the first session of a new body, the European conference. Feted by Tony Blair and lunched by the Queen, the visitors were intended to feel part of a broad European family stretching to the borders of the former Soviet Union. The real negotiating, which will begin on March 31 in Brussels, will be a far less inclusive affair: only six of the 11 (p.24) (emphasis added)
Similarly, an earlier article in The Economist ('Eastward ho, they said warily',19.7.97 pp. 35-6) is illustrated with a map of current EU members, 'successful applicants' and 'unsuccessful applicants'. This is a much less positive image of the process of enlargement, despite the journal's usually positive, liberal views on Europe. Although the article acknowledges the importance of enlargement as central ambition of the EU, it also points to the growing tensions within the EU itself and debate concerning the possible economic security costs of enlargement:
...if over the next year or so EMU is delayed or even derailed the Union is likely to widen at an even slower pace. For the ensuing rancour, ructions and recriminations would make it much harder for EU governments to cope with the huge challenges presented by enlargement.(p.36)
This, and other news articles, point to the failure of the Amsterdam Treaty to settle institutional issues, especially the lack of progress towards reforming a framework developed for 6 member states not 20 or more:
Unless these institutional knots can be untied, the EU may have to try to struggle on as a Union of 20 or 25 members, crippled by a constitution designed for six, or else delay enlargement. (p.36) (emphasis added)
This has led some commentators to suggest that the EU is losing its commitment to expansion. Victor Smart ('Enlargement opens a can of worms', The European, 19-25.6.97, p.3) makes the point forcefully. He quotes an unnamed Brussel's 'source': 'Theoretically, all countries are on an equal footing. But the decision to postpone real institutional reform is the clearest indication yet that the EU intends to admit only three or four newcomers in the next few years.' (p.3). And he goes on to point out the economic position underlying the increasing reluctance to enlarge:
Bringing east European countries into the EU is likely to prove far more difficult than any previous enlargement. If all ten applicants were to join they would increase the EU's population by around 30 per cent, but its GDP by only four per cent. ... The clear message from Amsterdam is that for those already in the club, welcoming new members is a diminishing priority. (p3) (emphasis added).
The accompanying map and graphics emphasise the growing divide within Europe. Similarly, the map illustrating Charles Bremner's article 'Santer maps out new 21-member EU and key spending reforms' (The Times, 17.7.97) emphasises entrenchment of the enlargement process. In this case, only the existing members and six new applicant states are shown. No attempt is made to map out further enlargement. Even this modest extension, to create a "...map of a new 21-member European Union, with borders reaching the Russian frontier...", is premised on a closing of ranks among the older member states, in which 'France and other founder countries are banking on the launch of monetary union in 1999 as the key to ensuring the existence of a close-knit core of members who will resist the dilution of the European enterprise.'
As in the early 1990s, a number of subsidiary myths and metaphors have been activated in both the maps and the accompanying text, in response to changing conditions. The concept of 'fortress Europe' re-emerges as important, but now in relation to realist concerns over economic and demographic security, rather than as a prompt to integration. This is typified by discussion of the Schengen accords (signed in 1985 and 1990), designed to eradicate internal frontiers within Europe. Consisting mainly of EU states (although not UK or Eire) and a number of Nordic states, Schengen has yet to be fully implemented. Worries about weak-points within the system, which could result in the influx of large number of refugees, have created doubts about its efficacy and the potential for its full extension beyond the core members (Germany, France, the Benelux group, Spain and Portugal) with their stricter border controls.
The conservative approach to this issue is typified by Toby Helm's article ''Fortress' breached by rising flood of refugees' (Daily Telegraph, 6.1.98 (ET)), in which the situation is described in very negative terms - "With thousands of Kurdish refugees now on the move, the weakness of a "fortress Europe" that is only as strong as its weakest outpost [Italy] has been cruelly exposed". While reminiscent of earlier images of the 'strong-hold' under threat, this article does not offer a promise couched in integrationist terms, but in terms of entrenchment -"Germany, Austria and France have reacted to the Kurdish problem by strengthening internal border patrols, and the crisis has raised questions about the commitment of EU member states to the Schengen plan for a pass-port free Europe." The accompanying map, very similar in construction to those published in the early 1990s, is used to re-iterate the dilemmas facing Europe and graphically exemplify the threat to the European core. This time, however, the myth does not offer a solution through integration, but by exclusion. As Helm notes, 'The Schengen agreement lies at the heart of the integrationists' vision of a united Europe free of national barriers.Schengen is supposed to be a practical demonstration of what the European project is all about.'
It is worth noting that this realist turn may reflect a particularly British view of Europe. An article from the Irish Times of the same period contibued to present a pro-western, triumphalist stance. Patrick Smyth's article, 'Mood swing puts a spring in the euro's step', (Irish Times, 30.12.97, p. 2) claerly falls into the earlier mould. It includes a large full-colour map showing several potential phases ofEU enlargement - a very positive integrationist image. Smyth clearly believes in the inherent superiority of the western model and its application to the rest of the region. For instance, he notes, "That the next enlargement will be truly historic is beyond doubt, a reconciliation of the division of Europe since the Second World War and the triumph of the western social democratic/Christian democratic model" (p2) (emphasis added). He is also in favour of the deepening of political and security structures within the EU, for example, the development of the military role of EU.
Clearly, this anecdotal evidence cannot provide evidence for national-cultural variations, but it suggest that these may exist and may be worth examining in future research of this kind.
NATO and maps of the new Iron Curtain?
Membership of European (military) security structures is another form of political integration championed by the west, and eagerly sought by many central and eastern European states. However, late 1990s UK news coverage and cartographic represenations again reflect a growing wariness regarding further expansion of full membership. Realist critiques inform a number of aspects of this evolving discourse. While there has been some balanced debate concerning the futureof NATO in the post-war period, much of the recent media discussion has focused on the potential divide created by inclusion of some of the new European states, and the exclusion of others. This is further fueled by the issue of Russian antipathy to NATO membership for any of the former republics of the Soviet Union (especially the Baltic States).
The Economist ('Who will join the club?', 7.6.97, p.48-9) is representative of relatively balanced reporting of the issue of NATO enlargement. The accompanying map shows present members, 'front runners', 'possibles' and 'other applicants'. This graphic is much more typical of the early 1990s, and again confirms the liberal-integrationist stance of this journal. In contrast to The Economist's coverage is a series of articles published in the Daily Telegraph between February and July 1997. The first, 'Nato falls in line for expansion eastwards' (by Christopher Lockwood, Daily Telegraph, 20.2.97 (ET)), reflects the integrationist view of many Nato member states, especially the US. Expansion is portrayed as a 'seductive scenario' for European security. Even Russian membership is not ruled out as an eventual outcome. However, Russian's effective veto on further expansion casts a realist shadow over the article. Much of the text is concerned with the 'sweeteners' needed to bring Russia 'on-side', while the map entitled 'The new Iron Curtain' emphasises a realist, power politics vision of the future of European security.
By April the rhetoric has become much more overtly realist. In Francis Harris' article 'Nato row pitches Slovaks into the 'Balkan league'' (Daily Telegraph, 13.4.97 (ET)), he notes that "Tensions are rising along NATO's emerging new frontier. As the countdown begins for admission to the West's military club, Czechs and Slovaks are trading insults along the line most likely to become the new East-West divide" (emphasis added). The map, entitled 'Nato's new frontier', draws a heavy line between those states who are 'in' and those who are 'out'. A similar article, published several months later (Francis Harris and Krzysztof Leski, 'Nato's three new armies 'in all kinds of mess'' (Daily Telegraph, 6 7 97 (ET))) is again illustrated by a map showing 'Nato's new frontier'.
Another Telegraph article, published mid-July, takes up the theme of liberal-idealist versus realist views. While the tone is still largely pro-integration (Lockwood, 'There's safety in numbers, even when the threat is past', Daily Telegraph, 10.7.97 (ET)) it clearly signals the growing importance of realist critiques. Both George Kennan (architect of US containment policy in the 1940s) and the Russian Foreign Minister, Yevgeny Primakov are quoted; the former regards expansion as "the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-Cold War era", the latter states that it would be "the biggest mistake since the end of the Second World War". This rhetoric is reflected in the US media as well. Lockwood refers to an editorial in The New York Times which declared that 'Given the absence of a clear threat to Europe and the possibility of so many unpredictable consequences, Nato expansion seems a gratuitous risk.' The article goes on to elaborate on the realist, power politics position regarding further integration:
...critics fear that the expansion could weaken Nato: first by provoking the Russians; second, by exposing the alliance to costs that are hard to predict; third, by importing still-fresh regional disputes into the alliance; and fourthly, by saddling it with three armies that are badly trained, poorly equipped and incompatible with Nato's operating procedures and weapons systems.
In a second article, Lockwood elaborates a key issue of recent NATO policy ('Nato redraws strategic map to weld 44-nation Europe', Daily Telegraph, 10.7.97 (ET)), the development of partnerships with ex-Soviet states in both Europe and central Asia (e.g. Partnership for Peace programme). He notes that "NATO moved again to re-draw the strategic map of Europe... by signing a security pact with Ukraine and inaugurating a Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council that brings together 44 nations." Such moves, according to critics of NATO expansion, are simply evidence of a failure to take the tough decisions needed on who should be included in further NATO enlargement and who will be left outside (see Sherr (1995); Kay (1997))
Clearly, the change from optimism in the whole-sale spread of western institutions as a means of overcoming the anxieties of the post-Cold War era, to a more cautious approach, is being reflected by the media's recent mappings of the European geopolitical landscape. While the public was earlier offered a vision of a Grand Strategy of integration stretching eastward to Russia, as an antidote to a potential descent into chaos, the new maps provide a more limited vision, based on a possible new East-West divide. These recent cartographic representations of Europe, while still supporting the integrationist ideal, seem designed to accustomise their readers to a renewal of a divided Europe, but this time ofthe West's own making.
Conclusions
This study has provided evidence of how maps in UK news media have been used to reinforce idealist-integrationist views of European security issues in the immediate post Cold-War period, but how the early 'tiumphalism' has been gradually replaced by 'realist' concerns. The role of news media maps during the mid to late 1990s can still be interpreted in terms of stressing the continuing importance of the core region as a 'stronghold' of European ideals. The change, however, is in the nature of the 'promise' on offer. The early 1990s was a period of relative optimism. The repetition and reworking of subsidiary myths as visual (cartographic) images of 'threat' was partly a response to anxieties regarding the future, but was also a powerful element in the re-creation of a meta-myth which centred on the need to extend the superior institutions and ideals of the West to the new states in the east. In later maps the images of threat could be simplified to a few key elements. The taken-for-granted superiority of Western models of political and economic development have not diminished. However, the practicalities of 'widening' have altered the tone of the discourse and the nature of the accompanying maps. Issues of'dilution' and economic cost mean that the myth is now being re-presented cartographically in a modified form, one in which the core can only retain its vigour by 'deepening' and 'protecting' its structures (fortress-Europe!) rather than 'widening' its geographical boundaries.
The importance of understanding cartographic representation, in this case the use of maps in the news media, within the context of wider structures of (geo)political discourse is stressed throughout. While the study of 'persuasive' cartography hastraditionally focused on individual maps and the connotative dsign practices used to construct them, this suggests that any attempt to make sense of these maps must take note of the broader socio-political milieu within in which they operate. It is arguedthat the maps in this specific study only make sense if seen as integral to a dialectic between 'idealist' and 'realist' conceptions of the political world. It must also be noted that this paper is only concerned with the UK news media. A wider cross-cultural study of the period in question is likely to undercover differences in emphasis among national elite views of the'European project'. There is evidence to suggest that a more optimistic view may still prevail across much of Europe (see discussion of article in The Irish Times) and within key institutions (e.g. NATO). The changes indicated by this paper may reflect the UK's 'insular' position (both literally and metaphorically) with regard to Europe and the 'European' project of integration. It may also reflect an 'Atlanticist' perspective, which ties it in to a wider global perspective (for example, as the United States' deputy in policing the 'new World Order').
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